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Introduction
In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions 
are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions, since 
there is no consensus yet on what causes delusions. Some of the defining features of 
delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, 
as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence. 
Other defining features of delusions are psychological and focus on whether delusions 
are harmful, as in the definition of delusions as beliefs that disrupt good functioning. 
Even if the epistemic features go some way towards capturing what otherwise 
different instances of clinical delusions have in common, they do not succeed in 
distinguishing delusions as a clinical phenomenon from everyday irrational beliefs. 
Focusing on the psychological features is a more promising way to mark the 
difference between clinical and non-clinical irrational beliefs, but there is wide 
variability in the extent to which delusions are psychologically harmful, and some 
everyday irrational beliefs can affect functioning in similarly negative ways. In this 
chapter we consider three types of belief that share similar epistemic features and 
exhibit variation with respect to how psychologically harmful they are: (1) delusions 
of thought insertion, (2) alien abduction beliefs, and (3) self-enhancing beliefs. In 
the light of the similarities and differences among these cases, we highlight the 
difficulty in providing an answer to what makes an irrational belief delusional.
1. Definitions and examples of Clinical Delusions
In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of 
‘normal’ cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface 
features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their 
occurrence. Aetiological considerations about psychiatric disorders are the object 
of study and debate, but they often cannot play a significant classificatory and 
diagnostic role, because there is not sufficient knowledge or consensus about the 
causal history of those disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to identify a 
pathological behaviour as the symptom of a certain disorder, as disorders that are 
likely to differ both in their causal histories and in their overall manifestations may 
give rise to very similar patterns of behaviour.
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Delusions are a good example of how symptoms of psychiatric disorders are 
defined in terms of their surface features.2 Such features are largely epi stemic. Key 
terms include ‘belief ’, ‘proof ’, ‘evidence’, ‘ judgement’, ‘warrant’, ‘false hood’, and 
‘incorrectness’.
Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality 
that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what 
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The 
belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or 
subculture (i.e. it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves 
a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so 
extreme as to defy credibility. Delusional conviction can sometimes be inferred 
from an overvalued idea (in which case the individual has an unreasonable 
belief or idea but does not hold it as firmly as is the case with a delusion).3
A person is deluded when they have come to hold a particular belief with a 
degree of firmness that is both utterly unwarranted by the evidence at hand, 
and that jeopardises their day-to-day functioning.4
Consider the following examples of delusions. A man comes to believe that his 
parents were replaced by impostors when he was a baby (Capgras delusion). Family 
members and healthcare professionals attempt to persuade him that his parents have 
not been substituted, but they fail. The man becomes hostile and aggressive towards 
his parents, trying to choke his mother on one occasion.5
A woman comes to believe that she is surrounded by alien forces controlling 
her actions and slowly taking over people’s bodies (delusion of persecution). She has a 
number of different delusional beliefs that are interrelated and affect her inter pre-
tation of most events occurring in her life. To protect herself and her loved ones, 
she breaks contact with her family and moves to a different city.6
A young woman is convinced that a fellow student is in love with her although 
the two have never spoken to each other (erotomania). She takes TV messages, the 
colour of dresses, licence plates on cars, and other sources as evidence that the 
young man is planning to marry her.7
Definitions of delusions that are largely epistemic are successful in highlighting 
what is common among the three cases we have brief ly described above. People 
who report delusions seem genuinely to believe what they are saying. Reports are 
endorsed with conviction even if they are not plausible given the person’s other 
beliefs. Delusions are tenaciously maintained in the face of challenges. The epistemic 
features of delusions exemplified by the three cases we have described are found in 
other clinical delusions, but also in a variety of everyday irrational beliefs.
Some of the definitions of delusions helpfully include some reference to the 
psychological features of delusions, that is, their effect on wellbeing or good 
functioning (see the definition above by McKay and colleagues). Delusions such as 
Capgras, delusions of persecution, and erotomania are often acted upon; they can 
become very disruptive and distressing, with pervasive and lasting negative effects 
on people’s lives.
Our goal here is to show how the similarities across the clinical/non-clinical 
spectrum make it difficult to demarcate delusions sharply. Beliefs epistemically 
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similar to clinical delusions include prejudiced beliefs, such as racist beliefs 
about black waiters offering a worse service and being less worthy of tipping;8 
superstitious beliefs, such as beliefs about nights with a full moon causing accidents;9 
and self-enhancing beliefs, such as excessively positive beliefs about one’s own 
qualities.10 Such beliefs are akin to delusional beliefs with respect to their epistemic 
features: their contents seem to be genuinely believed and held with conviction; 
moreover, beliefs are not only implausible, but also held in the face of apparent 
counter-evidence or counter-argument. Differently from delusional beliefs found 
in the clinical population, prejudiced, superstitious, or self-enhancing beliefs are 
not associated with a psychiatric diagnosis and are not generally accompanied by 
psychological distress.
In the rest of the chapter, we want to illustrate the continuity between clinically 
and non-clinically significant beliefs by reference to a delusion associated with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, the belief that a thought has been inserted in one’s head (section 
two); a belief that is common in certain sub-cultures, but is not mainstream, the 
belief that one has been abducted by aliens (section three); and a set of beliefs that are 
very widespread in the non-clinical population, self-enhancing beliefs (section four). 
Our goal is to show that similar deviations from norms of truth, justification, and 
rationality can be found across the clinical/non-clinical spectrum, and that there 
is also variability in the psychological effects of such beliefs. In the light of this, 
identifying what makes a belief delusional poses a major challenge, a challenge we 
return to in section five.
2. the Delusion of thought Insertion
In this section, we consider the case of thought insertion. Thought insertion is 
a symptom regularly associated with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. A thought 
is inserted when it has the quality of not being one’s own and is ascribed to an 
external agency.11
In thought insertion, people (1) experience a thought as alien or foreign (experience 
of an alien thought), and (2) offer an explanation for this experience, that is, that 
some third party is inserting thoughts into their head (the delusional explanation of 
the experience in terms of literal, non-metaphorical insertion). We are going to offer some 
examples of thought insertion that have been taken from various threads about 
thought insertion on mental health forums on different websites.12
Often, in a quiet place, and all the time at night when I am alone, I experience 
thoughts that do not ‘feel’ like my own. It’s like they come out of a part of 
my brain that is not the part that controls my ‘normal’ thoughts and into my 
awareness from there. It is hard to describe. These ‘false thoughts’ are usually 
about random subject matter and usually make little sense, but are extremely 
distracting. Back when I first experienced them, I thought I was psychic and 
that I was picking up other people’s thoughts (telepathy?). However, now I 
know that they are a part of psychosis because I experience them around the 
times I hallucinate.13
Yes, I get thought insertion all the time. Mine is pretty bizarre though and I 
have enough insight to realize this. I get thoughts directly from the government 
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and sometimes even alien beings from another world. There were times that it 
was very severe. Sometimes it is scary because they tell me things and what to 
do. I haven’t been getting thought insertion that recently since I have been doing 
better though. I get these thoughts because of a chip in my head[;] even though 
this technology is being used against me, I am still fascinated by technology all 
around me good and bad. People see technology around them but they don’t 
realize that the gov has technology that is 200 years more advanced than our 
own and the aliens are even further along than that. I have psychic powers 
as well, but not picking up thoughts from others around me (except this has 
happened a few times) but my psychic powers are mainly telling the future and 
inf luencing events around the world. I am not proud of this power.14
i truly do have unwanted thoughts that are forced into my head from 
somewhere... I mean I will have a thought saying my grandmother is a bitch. I 
would never ever think of my grandmother as a bitch. She is one of the greatest 
women I know and I adore her. So how is that a delusion? It is an intrusive 
thought! I sure didnt imagine it!.... i really do not think my grandmother is 
a bitch. i think these thoughts are evil and came from an evil being. Some 
thoughts however that pop into my head all of a sudden are my own thoughts 
and i can recognize that even though they are unwanted, but some are just plain 
ridiculous and mean and i know must be from an outside force. That’s just what 
i believe. probably has nothing to do with my illness.15
The first two examples above (from Alienonite and Firebird) highlight that there 
is a real phenomenon with perplexing features. The person believes that some 
thoughts have been ‘inserted’ and have an alien quality to them. The thoughts are 
described as ‘different from my usual thoughts’ or ‘false’. Alienonite previously 
believed that she must be psychic. Firebird claims he has the insight to realise that 
his experiences are bizarre, yet he still believes that thoughts entering his stream of 
consciousness are coming from aliens and from the government via a chip in his 
head. Both Alienonite and Firebird lack a sense of ownership and agency regarding 
these thoughts. Alienonite says that the thoughts ‘do not feel like her own’, and 
Firebird is certain the thoughts come from others. They also have other anomalous 
experiences and beliefs: Alienonite has hallucinations, and Firebird believes he has 
special powers. The third example (from Star-28) is of a thought that the person 
does not like and does not want to have. Star-28 insists that she would not think about 
her grandmother in the way the alien thought suggests, and says that the thought 
‘must be from an outside force’.
Ordinarily one does not question ownership of one’s experiences — if one 
picks up a pen to write something, one does not have to ask who picked up the 
pen; if one feels happy about eating an ice-cream in the sun, one does not have to 
ask who is feeling happy. Arguably, it is self-evident that the physical and mental 
actions involved in doing things, feeling emotions, and having thoughts are one’s 
own. Those actions could not be but one’s own. That is why it is so hard to grasp 
what people mean when they say that they ‘experience’ and access by introspection 
thoughts that are not their own.16
There are some obvious features that make the belief that a thought has been 
inserted into one’s head a delusion. The belief is usually firmly held, resistant to 
challenges, and accompanied by other unusual experiences that could be associated 
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with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. But what is commonly called ‘thought insertion’ 
is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon and there are multiple ways in which 
it might manifest itself. The experience of a thought being alien does not itself count 
as a delusional belief. For instance, the experience of a thought which is not owned 
can be one which is relatively neutral. Consider a person experiencing thoughts 
that seem alien but have a content she might well think anyway. The content of 
the thought is not threatening or problematic, and it does not contain distressing or 
unwanted ideas. Whilst the experience of having a thought that feels alien may be 
distressing, the content of the thought itself might not have a detrimental effect on 
the person. A person experiencing thought insertion with extremely distressing or 
unpleasant content might find it difficult to ignore her experience, and live with it. 
The nature or strength of the threat to the self (or threat to the ego) and the way 
a person responds to it determines whether the alien thought becomes problematic 
or detrimental.
This kind of experience is not yet a delusion (even if the person is certain that 
the thoughts are not hers). If the phenomenon persists and no explanation is found, 
then the person may search for relief from the strange experience, and come to a 
personally salient explanation, for example, that another is contacting her telepathically. 
A belief about how the thought is inserted qualifies as a delusion in some of the 
definitions we considered earlier if it seems to be a genuine belief, is held with high 
conviction, has an implausible content, and is resistant to counterevidence. Prior 
to the development of the belief about having been telepathically contacted, the 
phenomenon might have been described as a mere perceptual anomaly.
The phenomenon of thought insertion has differing degrees of intrusion or 
inf luence, from little or no inf luence to a compulsion to think (and perhaps do) 
what the voice or thought commands. The level of intrusion, distress, and inf luence 
might be regarded as a secondary phenomenon. In psychiatry (as in the rest of 
medicine) a value judgment which relates to the harm or potential harm that the 
experience of thought insertion has for the person is made by the clinician to 
determine diagnosis and therapeutic intervention.17
3. alien abduction Belief
In this section we will consider claims made by some people that they have been 
abducted by aliens, and ref lect on the similarities and differences between their 
beliefs and clinical delusions. As is the convention in the literature, we will refer to 
people who believe that they have been abducted by aliens as ‘abductees’. Consider 
three representative reports from Richard McNally and Susan Clancy’s studies of 
abductees’ experiences:
A female abductee was lying on her back when she woke up from a sound 
sleep. Her body was completely paralyzed and she experienced the sensation of 
levitating above her bed. Her heart was pounding, her breathing was shallow, 
she felt tense all over. She was terrified. She was able to open her eyes, and 
when she did so, she saw three beings standing at the foot of her bed in the 
glowing light.
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[A] female abductee was lying on her back when she woke up in the middle 
of the night. She was completely paralyzed, and felt electrical vibrations 
throughout her body. She was sweating, struggling to breathe, and felt her heart 
pounding in terror. When she opened her eyes, she saw an insect-like alien 
being on top of her bed.
A male abductee awoke in the middle of the night seized with panic. He was 
entirely paralyzed, and felt electricity shooting throughout his body. He felt 
his energy draining away from him. He could see several alien beings standing 
around his bed.18
An initial reaction to these reports is to question whether people actually believe 
their bizarre claims. Aside from the sheer implausibility of abductees’ claims, there 
are no reasons for thinking that they disbelieve them or are lying with respect to 
them. Additionally, McNally and Clancy found that the physiological responses 
of abductees when listening to recordings of themselves reporting their abduction 
experience were larger than the responses that subjects with Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) exhibited when listening to scripts of their experiences.19 
They take this finding to ‘underscore the power of emotional belief ’, and though 
abductees may not qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD, their psychophysiologic profiles 
will ‘resemble that of PTSD patients’.20 These experimental results might be 
indicative of abductees believing the reports in the scripts they listen to, and their 
doing so would explain their reactions to them which are in line with reactions 
people with PTSD have to hearing scripts of their traumatic experiences.
How do abductees come to hold these bizarre beliefs? A typical case is described 
by McNally as involving the following: a person has the kind of experience given 
in the reports above; she wonders what happened, starts reading about the kind of 
experience she had, sees a therapist who endorses the abduction explanation for such 
an experience, and enters into memory recovery sessions via hypnosis. That person 
may then start generating more details under hypnosis about the experience and 
what happened thereafter, such as being ‘whisked through walls up into the sky into 
the spaceships’, being ‘sexually probed by aliens’, and ‘involved in hybrid breeding 
experimentation’ before being ‘brought back down to the bedroom, before the 
break of dawn’.21
Some theorists working on abduction beliefs explain why abductees have the 
experiences that they do by appeal to awareness during sleep paralysis (ASP) and 
hypnopompic hallucinations. During Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep, the 
sleeper is immobilized, insofar as motoric output is blocked. Sometimes a sleeper 
can wake up before the paralysis has disappeared, and they can become aware that 
they are unable to move.22 ASP can be accompanied by an increase in heart rate, 
difficulty breathing, and feelings of dread.23
Sleep paralysis can be accompanied by hypnopompic hallucinations, so the 
sleeper is unable to move and is also hallucinating sights and sounds in this state. 
Visual hallucinations might include ‘lights, animals, strange figures, and demons’, 
and auditory hallucinations might include ‘heavy footsteps, humming or buzzing 
noises, and sounds of heavy objects being moved’.24
Imagine opening your eyes shortly before dawn, attempting to roll over in 
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your bed, and suddenly realizing that you are entirely paralyzed. While lying 
helplessly on your back and unable to cry out for help, you become aware of 
sinister figures lurking in your bedroom. As they move closer to your bed, your 
heart begins to pound violently and you feel as if you are suffocating. You hear 
buzzing sounds, and feel electrical sensations shooting throughout your body. 
Within moments, the visions vanish and you can move again. Terrified, you 
wonder what has just happened.25
Having an experience of this kind leads some people to search for an explanation. 
Some people may know the real cause of the experience and so search no longer. 
However, though awareness during sleep paralysis and hallucination is relatively 
high among the general population, knowledge of these states is not common. 
For this reason, it is unlikely for the experience to be explained by appeal to such 
states.26
We now turn to the epistemic surface features which typically characterize 
abduction beliefs, in order to show similarities between abduction beliefs and 
delusions with respect to their deviation from ideal epistemic standards. We saw 
earlier that delusional beliefs are firmly held despite contrary evidence. In her book 
Abducted, Clancy notes that
Once the seed of belief was planted, once alien abduction was even suspected, 
the abductees began to search for confirmatory evidence. And once the search 
had begun, the evidence almost always showed up. [...] Once we’ve adopted the 
initial premises (‘I think I’ve been abducted by aliens’), we find it very difficult 
to disabuse ourselves of them; they become resilient, immune to external 
argument.27
We might also think that the evidence abductees have does not strongly support the 
content of a belief, since oftentimes there are alternative explanations available to 
them. Even when abductees are aware of the naturalistic explanations for their exper-
iences, they do not adopt these explanations. This also suggests that alien abduction 
beliefs are similar to delusional beliefs with respect to their epistemic features.
It might be thought that alien abduction beliefs are different from delusional 
beliefs since beliefs with alien abduction content are shared within a culture, and 
rather culture-specific (most abductees are to be found in the US). As we saw 
earlier, the DSM-5 definition of delusion suggests that a belief cannot be a delusion, 
or at least cannot be a bizarre delusion, if it is shared within a culture: ‘Delusions 
are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not understandable to same-
culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life experiences. [...].’ Alien abduction 
beliefs are ‘clearly implausible’, but they are held by many people; indeed there are 
mini-cultures of abductees. Typically, alien abduction beliefs are not collective beliefs 
(comparable to folie à deux cases). Rather, they are individualized, but held by many 
individuals.
Here we do not take a stand on whether alien abduction beliefs are delusional 
beliefs. We just observe that the stipulation in the DSM which rules out that alien 
abduction beliefs are delusions because they are widely held does not speak against 
the epistemic similarities we have drawn between cases of alien abduction belief 
and cases of delusion.
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4. Self-enhancing Beliefs
In this section, we want to focus on self-enhancing beliefs. So-called ‘positive illu-
sions’ are defined as ‘enduring patterns of beliefs’ about self, world, and future, and 
are prevalent in the non-clinical population. There are at least three types of posi-
tive illusions.28
Some beliefs are about the capacity that the person has to control external events 
(illusion of control). Subject to such illusory perceptions, the person tends to believe 
that her thoughts affect the external world more than they actually do and that 
it is in her power to bring about positive events. Further, positive illusions affect 
self-perception, self-evaluation, and autobiographical memory. The person inter-
prets her past performance as better than it actually was, and sees herself as more 
attractive, skilful, talented, and virtuous than average (self-enhancement). Inter-
estingly, the biases affecting self-perception seem to apply to the person’s romantic 
partner as well. What psychologists call ‘the love-is-blind bias’ is the tendency to 
see romantic partners as more attractive, intelligent, and talented than they actually 
are. This is generally thought to contribute to satisfying and lasting relationships. 
Finally, the person believes that her future will bring progress, and that it will not 
feature negative events that are statistically very common, such as a serious illness 
or a break-up (unrealistic optimism).
Although positive illusions are a robust phenomenon in people of different sex, 
age, economic status, and culture, they can manifest differently across individuals, 
and some illusions seem to be culture-dependent. In Japanese culture, for instance, 
evi dence for illusions of control has been found, but there is little evidence for 
positive self-regard or enhanced self-esteem, and more evidence for self-criticism in 
com parison with Western samples.29 Some psychologists argue that positive illusions 
are biologically adaptive and improve people’s chances to survive, reproduce, and 
have lasting relationships that ensure protection for their offspring.30 One of the 
most discussed findings is that positive illusions promote mental health, helping 
people find meaning in their lives, be caring, motivated, creative, productive, and 
develop resilience, that is, the capacity to ‘bounce back’ after adversities.31
Unrealistic optimism about health prospects can have immediate psychological 
benefits, as people are less worried about their future if they think that they are 
unlikely to suffer from a disease. But there are also significantly bad consequences 
when people underestimate risks and fail to adopt preventive measures that would 
improve their prospects. For instance, the belief that one is at low risk of negative 
outcomes may lead to the decision to continue smoking due to the belief that one 
is unlikely to suffer from lung cancer, or the decision not to use contraception due 
to the belief that one is unlikely to contract sexually transmitted diseases.32
Originally, Taylor distinguished positive illusions from delusions on the basis 
of positive illusions being more f lexible and more sensitive to evidence, but it 
has been shown that not only are positive illusions implausible given the available 
evidence, they also are resistant to negative feedback. Here is a telling example. In 
one interesting study, medical students’ assessment of their own ability at the end 
of medical school correlates with their initial assessment of their ability in their first 
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year, irrespective of supervisors’ ratings or exam results.33 One interpretation of 
how students manage to maintain positive self-evaluations is that they redefine the 
criteria for medical ability to match the criteria they can comfortably satisfy, and 
thus preserve a sense that they are medically able.34
Recently, further evidence has suggested that there are several strategies for main-
taining positive illusions in the light of challenges or negative feedback (Hepper and 
Sedikides 2012): (1) regarding positive evaluations as more reliable than negative 
ones; (2) interpreting ambiguous or neutral feedback as positive; (3) when failure is 
expected, behaving in a way that could be used to justify future negative feedback 
(for instance, drinking too much before an important exam); (4) when failure is 
experienced and negative feedback received, focusing on different aspects of one’s 
performance that are positive. Such strategies make positive illusions resistant to a 
variety of potential challenges.
This suggests that the difference between delusional beliefs and self-enhancing 
beliefs is not epistemically significant.
5. What Makes a Belief Delusional?
As we said, clinical delusions are characterized by surface features of two kinds, 
epi stemic (fixity, implausibility) and psychological (negative impact on functioning). 
As it has already been observed,35 epistemic features alone are not sufficient to de marc-
ate delusions from other irrational beliefs. We have looked at three cases of irra tional 
belief which share these epistemic features. In this section, we want to con sider 
whether the psychological criterion is more promising for distinguishing delusions.
People working on the diagnostic manuals used in psychiatry rely on levels of 
distress to establish what a disorder is:
In the absence of clear biological markers or clinically useful measurements 
of severity for many mental disorders, it has not been possible to completely 
separate normal and pathological symptom expressions contained in diagnostic 
criteria.... a generic diagnostic criterion requiring distress or disability has been 
used to establish disorder thresholds, usually worded ‘the disturbance causes 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning’.36
Here we would like to suggest that it is not straightforward to base the distinction 
between delusional and non-delusional beliefs on psychological effects. This is 
because not all the phenomena classified as delusional impair good functioning, 
and alien abduction beliefs and self-enhancing beliefs that are not delusional can 
compromise good functioning.
In the psychological and psychiatric literature it has been suggested that some delu-
sions enhance the sense that one’s life is meaningful,37 and that there are ‘successful 
psychotics’.38 In some cases, people are able to find additional meaning in life thanks 
to the formation of a delusion, and their functioning is not seriously impaired as a 
result. One such case is Simon, a lawyer with a happy family life and a good career:
[...] Out of the blue, he was threatened by a malpractice legal action from a group 
of his colleagues. Although he claimed to be innocent, mounting a defence 
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would be expensive and hazardous. He responded to this crisis by praying in 
front of an open bible placed on a small altar that he set up in his front room. 
After an emotional evening’s ‘outpouring’ he found that wax from two large 
candles on the altar had run down onto the bible marking out various words 
and phrases (he called these wax marks ‘seals’ or ‘suns’). [...] From this time 
on, Simon received a complex series of ‘revelations’ largely conveyed through 
the images left in melted candle wax. They meant nothing to anyone else 
including Simon’s Baptist friends and family. But for Simon they were clearly 
representations of biblical symbols particularly from the book of Revelations 
signifying that ‘I am the living son of David... and I’m also a relative of Ishmael 
and... of Joseph’. [...] His special status had the effect of ‘increasing my own 
inward sense, wisdom, understanding, and endurance’ which would ‘allow me 
to do whatever is required in terms of bringing whatever message it is that God 
wants me to bring’.39
The description above stresses the role of delusions in giving the agent a sense of 
purpose and meaning, and downplays the negative effects on wellbeing that delu-
sions are often characterized as having. This is probably due to the self-enhancing 
content of the delusions reported (e.g. Simon thinks of himself as gifted and invested 
with special responsibilities) and the support provided by the person’s immediate 
social circle.
In the context of thought insertion, there are some relevant sub-clinical cases. An 
example is that of people who run or attend spiritualist churches where it is a special 
skill to have access to the thoughts of the dead in one’s stream of consciousness. 
To experience alien thoughts is not only culturally normal (within the sub-culture 
of the spiritualist church) but culturally desirable. The belief that one can access the 
thoughts of the dead is implausible and badly supported by evidence, but it does not 
have an adverse impact on the person’s functioning and well-being. The fact that no 
adverse impact is observed may be due to intrapersonal or interpersonal factors.40
Intrapersonally, the person may not have any other experience or belief that 
would count as bizarre outside her sub-culture, and her belonging to the church 
may serve as an explanation of her having inserted thoughts. The psychological 
history of the person developing the delusion is important when we are interested in 
the difference between clinical and non-clinical irrational beliefs. Interpersonally, 
the local acceptability of the belief and the fact that it does not lead to social 
isolation but potentially to better integration may be a powerful antidote against 
psychological harm. A person who believes that she is receiving the thoughts of the 
dead but (a) does not belong to a spiritualist church, (b) has no desire to experience 
these thoughts, and (c) has no background that might explain why this seems to be 
happening is likely to be more distressed by these experiences than the spiritualist 
church-goer.
Let us look back to alien abduction belief. Alien abduction belief can be charac-
terized by distress and preoccupation. Although formal psychiatric interviews with 
abductees uncover little pathology (for example see McNally and Clancy, ‘Sleep 
Paralysis, Sexual Abuse, and Space Alien Abduction’), some abductees display 
acute distress: three of ten abductees in McNally and Clancy’s study nearly met the 
criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD following their abduction experience. Mean scores 
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on questionnaires relating to depression and anxiety, though, put abductees within 
normal limits, such that they were indistinguishable from control groups.41
As we saw, McNally and Clancy’s abductees displayed a similar physiological 
profile when listening to scripts of their experiences to that of subjects suffering 
from PTSD. Abductees were also found to report ‘heightened ratings of arousal, 
fear, surprise, and imagery vividness during exposure to scripts featuring their most 
traumatic abduction memories’.42 Reporting on this work, Clancy notes that ‘[n]ot 
only were the physiological reactions of abductees similar to those of documented 
trauma victims, such as combat vets and rape victims; in some cases, they were even 
more extreme’. And the ‘alien abduction memories that emerge under hypnosis 
generate intense emotions — pain, terror, helplessness, awe’.43
Interestingly though, just like successful psychotics, some abductees do rather 
well out of having their beliefs. As McNally reports:
when I ask these subjects if you could do it all over again would you rather not 
have been abducted and they said well, when it first happened I was terrified, 
I had ontological shock, some of them would say, the whole fabric of my sense 
of the world was torn asunder. But then I realized that there are beings out 
there who care for us, for the fate of the earth, so on balance, yeah I think it’s 
a good thing.44
Finally, as suggested in section four, positive illusions have been considered as psych-
o logically beneficial, and even adaptive, as they enable people to develop coping 
strategies and maintain motivation in the face of challenges. Could this be the 
telling difference between positive illusions and delusions? Focusing on functioning 
is definitely helpful to map out the differences between clinical and non-clinical 
irrational beliefs, as we saw, but it is important to notice that self-enhancing beliefs 
have been exposed as potentially (physically and psychologically) harmful in some 
circumstances.45
More to the point, positive illusions that are especially resistant to negative 
feedback can give rise to excessively high expectations, and then disappointment, 
when the expected targets are not achieved. This may lead to agents being 
unprepared for set-backs.46 In the light of this, the recent psychological literature 
has suggested that psychological wellbeing and success (measured in terms of an 
agent’s capacity to pursue and achieve one’s goals) are not the default effects of 
positive illusions, but come from other characteristics (which may be, but do not 
need to be, positively correlated with self-enhancing beliefs), such as ‘sense of 
coherence’ and ‘hardiness’.
Sense of coherence has three components: ‘Comprehensibility, the extent to 
which an individual can make sense of adversity; Manageability, the extent to 
which an individual perceives that resources are at her or his disposal to meet 
the challenges of inordinate demands; and Meaning fulness, the extent to which 
an individual feels that the challenges faced are worth engagement with.’47
Hardiness has been defined as ‘a pattern of attitudes and strategies that together 
facilitate turning stressful circumstances from potential disasters into growth 
opportunities’.48 It supports personal growth and a sense of control: events are 
seen as stressful when the agent does not get a sense that she can control them, 
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while people who are curious and engaged see challenges as opportunities to 
grow and improve. Hardiness has been described as including (1) a commitment 
to oneself and work, (2) a sense of personal control over one’s experiences and 
outcomes, and (3) the perception that change represents a challenge and should 
be treated as an opportunity for growth rather than a threat.49
This is especially interesting as some people with elaborated delusions in the context 
of schizophrenia are found to have an increased sense of meaning fulness and sense of 
coherence with respect to non-clinical controls, when they find themselves in the 
acute stage of psychosis.50 Enhanced sense of meaningfulness and sense of coherence 
are due to the person feeling empowered by the delusion as a potential explanation 
of a puzzling experience, and are correlated with high levels of wellbeing. The 
sense of meaningfulness and the sense of coherence drop, for instance, in remission, 
because the delusion is no longer thought to provide a satisfactory explanation 
of the person’s experience. Levels of wellbeing also drop, and depression is likely 
to ensue, because the person realizes that the meaning she had ascribed to her 
experience was delusory.
Conclusions
Based on epistemic and psychological considerations, the prospect of arriving at a 
principled way to distinguish delusional from non-delusional beliefs is not promising. 
Delusions are a paradigmatic instance of irrationality and are generally harmful, 
impairing good functioning and causing anxiety and distress. But delusions are not 
always harmful and distressing. Also, other irrational beliefs (such as alien abduction 
beliefs and self-enhancing beliefs) share some epistemic features with delusions, and 
can have psychologically adverse effects in at least some contexts.
This suggests caution in the project of demarcating delusions, and supports the 
view that there is more continuity than is commonly thought between experiences 
and beliefs that are classified as clinically significant, and those that characterize the 
non-clinical population.
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